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Sequencing Capital Account Liberalization
Bright Okogu and Philip Osafo-Kwaako*
The increased integration of international financial markets provides both
opportunities for economic growth as well as challenges for macroeconomic
management in developing countries. By liberalizing their capital accounts,
developing country economies stand a better chance of leveraging resources
from the international capital market for investment and growth, and also
enable their domestic investors to diversify their portfolio of investments.
Capital account liberalization is, however, not without its challenges. Recent
financial crises in some emerging market economies highlight the need for an
appropriate sequencing of liberalization policies. Country experiences
indicate the need for macroeconomic stabilization, current account
liberalization, liberalization of the financial sector and effective prudential
financial sector regulation as preconditions for successful opening of the
capital account. This paper focuses on the case of Nigeria and examines
whether, following the successful implementation of the recent reform
program, appropriate policies are now in place for effective capital account
liberalization. We conclude that there is no simple answer as to the sequencing
process partly because the preconditions are not cast in absolutist terms.
Similarly, reforms are a process rather an event suggesting that a gradualist
approach to liberalization is needed as Nigeria's economic reforms are
consolidated. Ultimately, the major benefits of capital account liberalization
in Nigeria may result not from its direct effect on GDP growth, but instead, by
promoting various collateral benefits such as strengthened domestic
institutions, improved financial supervision, and greater macroeconomic
discipline.

*Messrs Okogu and Osafo- Kwaako are Special Advisor, Federal Ministry of Finance and Research
Fellow, Federal Ministry of Finance, respectively. The views expressed herein do not represent the views of
the institution to which they are affiliated. The authors acknowledge the comments and suggestions of
anonymous reviewers. Comments should be directed to bokogu@gmail.com
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I. Introduction

T

he increased integration of international financial markets has been one
of the most notable developments of the past two decades. The rise in
international capital flows to developing countries has been
particularly significant, and spurred by demand for developing country debt
and equities which have become increasingly attractive to international
investors1. Aggregate net resource flows to developing countries increased
nearly fourfold from $62 billion in 1985, to $227 billion in 1995; and further
doubled to about $443 billion in 2005 (World Bank, 2006). There is
considerable debate in the literature on the benefits of capital account
liberalization. By liberalizing their capital accounts, developing countries
could improve access to international capital needed for investment and
growth, and also enable domestic investors to diversify their portfolio
investments. The experiences of some emerging economies however provide
lessons on potential risks associated with capital account liberalization, such as
overheating of the domestic economy and asset price inflation. Effective
macroeconomic management is needed if developing countries are to benefit
from international capital flows, while minimizing its undesirable side effects.
This paper examines the case of Nigeria, and assesses whether appropriate
policies are now in place for successful capital account liberalization. Our
focus here is on the pace and sequencing of liberalization. In this paper, capital
account liberalization is defined as the removal of prohibitions on transactions
in the capital and financial accounts of the balance of payments. It includes the
removal of exchange and other controls which may hinder the movement of
international capital, either as foreign direct investments or short-term
portfolio capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the
theoretical literature on the benefits of capital account liberalization and
briefly summarizes some empirical results on the relationship between capital
account liberalization and growth. Section 3 presents some principles of
1

For example, net private flows (debt + equity) more than tripled in the past five years, from $154
billion in 2001 to about $491 billion in 2005 (World Bank, 2006).
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successful capital account liberalization, while section 4 reviews some country
experiences to draw lessons on appropriate sequencing of capital account
liberalization. Section 5 reviews Nigeria's recent economic reforms and
examines whether appropriate policies are in place to support capital account
liberalization. Section 6 provides a summary of previous arguments and
outlines future challenges for Nigerian policymakers on the sequencing of
capital account liberalization. The paper is concluded in section 7.
II.

Some Current Literature on Capital Account Liberalization

II.1

Review of the Theoretical Literature

There are two main schools of thought in the theoretical debate on the benefits
of the capital market liberalization. The first hypothesis is based on an
“efficient market” argument, whereas a second school of thought argues that
“information asymmetry” hinders the efficient operation of global financial
markets.
The 'efficient market' view is derived from neoclassical arguments of
allocative efficiency, and may be summarized in five parts as follows. First, it
is argued that states should focus on maximizing their GNP (i.e. net income of
their citizens), and not solely their GDP (i.e. the output of the country).
Liberalizing their financial markets therefore supports a more efficient
allocation of international capital, provides outlets for investments, and
enables domestic economic agents to obtain the highest possible returns on
their investments, even if abroad2. Second, open capital markets benefit a
country by providing opportunities for inter-temporal trade and cross-border
diversification of investment portfolios. Inter-temporal trade enables countries
to borrow in times of low incomes, and to repay when incomes are higher,

2

For example, according to Cooper (1999), the McKinsey Global Institute noted that South Korean
entrepreneurs had access to more favorable investment opportunities abroad, compared to investing in
major domestic industries which provided slightly lower returns. In such an instance, restricting export of
South Korean capital would result in lower national income, and even further, may discourage domestic
savings.

160

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

December 2006

3

thereby achieving consumption smoothing . By allowing portfolio
diversification, capital mobility provides risk-sharing, and enables countries
and firms to reduce their exposure to local shocks by spreading their
investments in various markets4.
Third, for middle-income and developing countries which tend to be net
importers of global capital, liberalization of their capital accounts permits an
inflow of international capital. Such funds are needed to support investments,
finance trade, and enhance growth. Fourth, capital account liberalization will
result in a global competition for funds which will encourage states to improve
their domestic business climates for investments. In an environment with
global capital mobility, states will be rewarded (with increased capital flows)
for ensuring macroeconomic discipline, improving their domestic investment
climates, and obtaining favorable international credit ratings5. Finally, it is
argued that it is increasingly difficult to enforce restrictions on capital
mobility- a good example being the high levels of capital flight from
developing countries. Therefore, from an efficiency viewpoint the mere costs
of policing the implementation of capital controls are likely to outweigh the
intended benefits of monitoring, and result in significant distortions and
welfare losses. In addition to the above arguments, membership of the IMF
obliges countries under Article I (IV) the “…establishment of a multilateral
system of payments in respect of current transactions between members and in
the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of
world trade”.
A slightly contrasting view, based on “information asymmetry” theory, argues
that financial markets are heavily dependent on access to information, which
may be unequally available to economic agents (Stiglitz, 2000). Information
asymmetry results in various problems due to moral hazard behavior (e.g.
3

Essentially countries run current account deficits with capital account surpluses in one period, and then
run capital account deficits in subsequent periods.
4
Even for countries as a whole, such capital flows are beneficial in equilibrating temporary imbalances in
their current accounts (Cooper, 1999).
5
More generally, a number of 'pull' factors are believed to assist in attracting foreign capital including,
prevailing investment climate, credit ratings, secondary market prices of sovereign debt, domestic rates of
return, and interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign markets.
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banks financing low quality projects because international funds are
available), and adverse selection problems (e.g. where it is difficult to
distinguish between good and bad investment opportunities). The existence of
such distortions suggests that efficiency arguments may have limitations in
financial market liberalization.
In addition, financial markets sometimes tend to behave erratically, resulting
in “herding” or “bandwagon” behavior by speculators6. International capital
flows can sometimes be pro-cyclical, and exacerbate instability in emerging
market economies. For example, there are many instances where capital
account liberalization tends to spur the flow of short-term portfolio capital
('hot money') which tends to be highly reversible compared with more longterm foreign direct investments (Stiglitz, 2000). The information asymmetry
school of thought argues for limitations on capital mobility, and a
strengthening of regulatory institutions to oversee international capital flows.
In summary, the concern is centered on the risk of domestic financial crises, as
well as increased vulnerability to instability in international markets.
Besides these two main theories, a third argument in support of capital account
liberalization has recently been proposed by Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei
(2006). Kose, et al acknowledge that capital account liberalization may
provide the benefits of GDP growth and reduced consumption volatility as
suggested by the 'efficient markets' argument above. However, they further
argue that increased financial integration could provide additional 'collateral
benefits' to liberalizing countries. In particular, the process of capital account
liberalization could serve as a catalyst in providing various 'collateral benefits'
to liberalizing countries such as fostering financial market and institutional
development, promoting better financial supervision, and improving
macroeconomic discipline. We find this view proposed by Kose, et al to be
particularly useful in assessing the potential benefits of capital account
liberalization for Nigeria.

6

See Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) for a recent review of herding in financial markets.
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Review of the Empirical Literature
In the empirical literature, studies which assess the impact of capital account
liberalization on economic performance have provided inconclusive results.
Two major types of measures are found in the empirical literature: de jure (or
rules-based measures) and de facto measures (Kose, et al., 2006). De jure
measures often construct indices based on IMF data published in the Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)7.
De facto measures however rely on relevant economic variables to construct
an index of capital account liberalization. For example, such measures
estimate openness by examining disparities between national savings rate and
investment rates, second, by looking at differences in onshore-offshore
interest rates, and third, by using the ratio of actual capital inflows and
outflows to GDP (see for example, Kraay, et al., 2002). It is important to note
that de jure measures typically indicate the presence or absence of controls, but
8
not the level of intensity of these restrictions . This consideration is particularly
important for recently reforming countries where it is clear that progress is
being made but the policies have not yet been fully consolidated. The
international financial institutions such as the IMF, that develop and use
openness measures for policy design would need to go deeper by refining these
measures.
Most empirical work estimates the impact of capital account liberalization on
other growth variables such as level of schooling, investments, and level of
GDP. Results point to modest positive gains attained for capital account
7

For example, Quinn (1997) constructs indices which reflect the intensity of capital account liberalization
based on AREAER descriptions. Scores from 0-2, increasing in steps of 0.5, are assigned for various
economies. A score of 0 indicates that capital flows are forbidden, 0.5 indicates that there are capital
controls or severe restrictions, 1.0 and 1.5 indicate various forms of tax-like restriction, whereas a score of
2.0 indicates that flows are completely free of any restrictions.
8
Thus, we can assess the current level of openness of Nigeria's capital account based on its current
AREAER classifications. According to the recent AREAER report (IMF, 2006), Nigeria maintains
restrictions on 6 out of 11 categories of capital account transactions. There are controls for transactions
related to: capital market securities, money market instruments, commercial credits, liquidation of direct
investment and personal capital movements. There are no restrictions on: direct investments, collective
investment securities, derivatives and other instruments, financial credits, guarantees, sureties, and other
financial backup facilities, and real estate transactions. We can therefore calculate Nigeria's score simply
as 6/11 or estimate a more detailed score based on the actual descriptions above.
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openness particularly for developed and middle-income countries, but with
minimal gains for low-income countries9. Recent research by the IMF
similarly finds no strong relationship between capital account liberalization
and growth, although it stresses the importance of strong intermediary
institutions in ensuring the benefits of openness (Prasad, et al, 2003). Capital
account liberalization is however still viewed as a desirable option for most
developing countries, but with greater emphasis placed on the sequencing and
speed of reforms (Johnston, 1998; Eichengreen, et al, 1998). In the next
section, we consider some principles of appropriate sequencing of capital
account liberalization, and subsequently examine some country case studies.
III.

Sequencing Capital Account Liberalization

It is important to note here that the debate on capital account liberalization is an
evolving one. In 1997, for example, a committee set up by the Fund came up
with a recommendation for its Article in this respect to be amended from a
wholesale promotion of liberalization to one which would “…enable the IMF
promote the orderly liberalization of capital movements” although the
amendment eventually did not happen. Following the Asian crisis of the late
1990s, the focus of the debate shifted from the merit of capital account
liberalization, to the preconditions for successful liberalization, i.e. policy
sequencing. On balance, there is widespread acceptance among economists
that successful capital account liberalization should be preceded by:
macroeconomic stabilization; domestic financial sector reform; current
account liberalization; and prudential regulation of the financial sector
(Fischer and Reisen, 1994; McKinnon, 1993; Johnston, 1998). Each of these
factors is examined briefly below.
Macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal adjustment are viewed as the first
essential step for successful capital account liberalization. This is particularly
important as there is the likelihood of the loss of monetary autonomy with a

9

See for example, Quinn (1997) and Edwards (2001).
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fully liberalized capital account . Fiscal control is therefore needed to
accommodate any adverse effects of capital movements. Stabilization must
therefore be achieved prior to the reform, to ensure that more expansionary
fiscal policies could be utilized to accommodate any contractionary shocks
due to liberalization of the capital account (Fischer and Reisen, 1994).
Domestic financial sector reform is also needed prior to liberalization,
particularly when there are instances of financial repression. This could
involve a range of policies such as high reserve ratios and liquidity
requirements, legal ceilings on interest rates and credit expansion, and
restrictions on lending portfolios by banks. Financial repression is undesirable
as it reduces incentives for savings, and results in the misallocation of capital to
inefficient and unproductive activities. In such an environment, where the
authorities set real domestic interest rates at a low level, capital account
liberalization may result in significant capital outflows and result in a balanceof-payment crisis. It is also argued that without financial sector reform,
removal of capital controls could result in a case of immiserizing external
borrowing. In such an environment, capital inflows are misallocated, so that
the social rates of return on investments are lower than the costs of funds,
leaving domestic citizens worse off.
Current account liberalization is also conventionally viewed as a precondition
for successful capital account liberalization (Edwards, 1984; McKinnon,
1973, 1993). Current account liberalization in this regard encompasses both
reduction of tariffs, as well as the removal of restrictions on payments for
current account transactions. When capital controls are removed, capital
inflows are likely, resulting in the possibility of a real exchange rate
appreciation. An appreciated real exchange rate may be undesirable as it may
harm competitiveness and reduce demand for domestic exports. Successful
trade liberalization is however often accompanied with some depreciation of
the real exchange rate - in order to stimulate exports and dampen domestic
10

Resulting from the so-called trilemma or Impossible Trinity that 'it is impossible to achieve the following
three desirable goals simultaneously: exchange rate stability, capital market integration and monetary
autonomy. Any pair of goals is achievable…but requires abandoning the third.' (Joshi, 2003:2)
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demand for imports induced by tariff reduction . Trade liberalization is
therefore essential to counteract the likelihood of a real exchange appreciation
resulting from the removal of capital controls. It is therefore advisable to
pursue liberalization of the current (trade) account first, followed by a gradual
12
relaxation of restrictions on the capital account .
Finally, successful opening of the capital account also requires strengthening
of domestic institutions and prudential financial sector regulation. Such
prudential practices are needed to ensure soundness of domestic financial
institutions, effective risk management, and protect investors. Specific
policies may include improving regulation and supervision, promoting
competition in the financial sector to ensure efficient allocation of resources,
introducing legal and accounting best practices to address systemic risks, and
removing bad loans from the balance sheets of banks (Agenor and Montiel,
1999).
IV.

Lessons from Country Case Studies

The recent experiences of some emerging market economies provide
instructive lessons on the sequencing and impact of capital account
liberalization. In this section, we summarize the experiences of Chile, Korea,
Indonesia and Thailand as presented by Johnston, et al (1997)13.
For Chile, reform of the financial sector was conducted prior to capital account
liberalization. The authorities focused on a restructuring of the banking
system, implementation of trade reforms, and liberalization of exchange rates.
Institutions tasked with financial regulation and supervision were also
strengthened. The country adopted a gradual approach in liberalizing the
capital account, by initially permitting inflows of direct and portfolio
investments, and subsequently, relaxing restrictions on capital outflows during
11

See Agenor and Montiel, 1999: 703-10 for a review of empirical evidence on this issue.
Besides its effect on the real exchange rate, others have argued that liberalizing the capital account
in the presence of restrictive trade policies will only tend to amplify existing distortions in the domestic
economy (see Edwards and van Wijnbergen, 1986).
13
Covering the period 1985-96, and in the case of Thailand, for the period stretching from 1985 up to
the 1997 currency crisis
12
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the reform process. Similarly, Korea pursued a gradual and sequenced
liberalization program. Financial sector reforms, trade reforms and exchange
rate reforms were conducted, while the government focused on ensuring
current account surpluses. Capital account transactions were gradually
liberalized as the authorities relaxed restrictions on capital inflows and
outflows.
In contrast, in the case of Indonesia, capital account liberalization facilitated
reform of domestic financial institutions. Authorities focused on growth of the
real non-oil sector, and relaxed restrictions on direct investment flows. Various
financial and monetary policy reforms were subsequently carried out to
improve the functioning of the domestic financial system. Portfolio capital
inflows were finally liberalized in 1989, but have been subject to close
supervision by the authorities. Capital outflows were liberalized at an early
stage of the reform process, while capital inflows (particularly portfolio
investments) were liberalized much later and gradually. As a result of its
relatively stronger fundamentals, Indonesia initially managed the regional
currency crises in June 1997 somewhat better than its neighbours. However,
speculative pressure on the Indonesian rupiah grew in July 1997, and prompted
the central bank to abandon its managed exchange rate regime.
Finally, in the case of Thailand an uncoordinated approach to capital account
liberalization with weak institutions resulted in a financial crisis. As part of an
export-led growth strategy, trade and industrial policy reforms were carried
out, while capital inflows were liberalized to attract foreign investments.
Capital outflows were only gradually liberalized. Moreover, despite an initial
reform of the banking sector in 1985, the financial sector remained weak, and
many banks had an over-exposure to property sector by the mid-1990s.
Inadequate supervision of the financial sector, coupled with large current
account deficit, rising inflation and high interest rates, precipitated a sudden
reversal of capital inflows and resulted in a currency crisis in 1997.
The country case studies broadly illustrate the need for a properly sequenced
approach to capital account liberalization and stress the importance of
developing strong domestic financial institutions. In Chile and Korea, a
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gradual and proper sequencing of capital account liberalization was
conducted, whereas in the case of Indonesia an initial opening of the capital
account supported the development and strengthening of the domestic
financial system. The experience of Thailand, in particular, highlights the need
for strong domestic institutions to support the process of capital account
liberalization.
V.

Implications for Nigeria

The foregoing discussion has surveyed the theoretical and empirical literature
on the potential benefits and risks of capital account liberalization. In this
section, we consider whether the appropriate preconditions and
complementary policies are now in place for a successful liberalization of
Nigeria's capital account. Nigeria currently maintains some restrictions on its
capital account transactions14. In this section, we examine at what stage during
the current economic reforms is it appropriate for the authorities to consider
full liberalization of Nigeria's capital account. To conduct our assessment, we
examine recent progress in Nigeria on each of the preconditions discussed
earlier in section 3.
Macroeconomic Stabilization
There is evidence that Nigeria had one of the most volatile economies in the
past two decades (World Bank, 2003). A pro-cyclical expenditure pattern and
persistent fiscal deficits often resulted in high inflation and low growth in the
economy. Macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal adjustment were therefore
needed in Nigeria, not only in the context of facilitating an opening of the
capital account, but more broadly to support growth.
Recent economic policies have emphasized macroeconomic stabilization as a
central component of the reform agenda. To improve the management of oil
revenues, a benchmark price for oil was introduced in the government budget.
Despite recent high oil prices, prudent benchmark prices of $25, $30, and $35
14

See footnote 2 under the section on review of empirical literature
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per barrel were adopted for government budgets in 2004, 2005, and 2006,
respectively; the 2007 budget currently under consideration by the National
Assembly is based on $40 per barrel. These are significantly lower than the
actual prices, making it easier to maintain monetary stability. The use of the
fiscal rule has delinked government expenditures from oil revenues, and
reduced the pro-cyclicality of government fiscal activities.
Government fiscal balance has improved considerably from previous deficits
(of about 3.5 percent of GDP) to a consolidated fiscal surplus of about 10
percent of GDP in 2004, and 11 percent of GDP in 2005. Recent improvements
in monetary policy have also strengthened macroeconomic stability in the
Nigerian economy. Monetary targets have been achieved, and inflation
reduced. The 12-month average inflation rate to July 2006 had declined to
about 13.5 percent. Interest rates have also gradually declined with prime
lending rates averaging about 16.5 percent in the first quarter of 2006 (CBN,
2006). The improved fiscal discipline of the government, and improved
macroeconomic environment resulted in the negotiation of a successful debt
relief package for Nigeria15, as well as the country's first ever sovereign credit
16
rating .
Current Account Liberalization
Prior to the tariff reform, Nigeria maintained a complex tariff structure,
comprised of about 19 bands (with 5146 lines at the HS-8 digit level); and with
tariffs ranging from 2.5 percent to 150 percent. For most of the postindependence period, Nigeria's trade regime was viewed as complex,
protectionist and opaque (WTO, 2005). Following the structural adjustment
programme (SAP) in 1986, a seven-year tariff schedule was adopted, which
significantly reduced tariff averages. A subsequent revision of the tariff
structure in 1995 further reduced average tariffs and simplified the tariff
structure. Despite these revisions, however, the tariff regime was still largely
15

As a result of the debt relief package, Nigeria successfully exited the Paris Club, and reduced its external
debt burden from $35 billion to $5 billion.
16
Both Fitch and S&P assigned Nigeria a sovereign credit rating of BB- with a stable outlook. This places
the country's debt rating at par with other emerging economies such as Brazil, Turkey, Venezuela and
Vietnam.
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viewed as opaque and complex. Since 1978, the government had introduced
policies on import prohibitions, which provided for an outright ban on selected
products, which were viewed as strategic for the economy, or in response to
complaints from manufacturing sector. The ad hoc use of import prohibitions
as well as other upward tariff revisions greatly reduced the predictability of the
tariff regime, as actual tariffs applied at the ports often deviated from published
tariffs.
As part of the recent economic reform program, Nigeria liberalized its current
account, by embarking on a comprehensive trade liberalization program aimed
at creating an open trading environment. The goal was to revise the previous
tariff structure, and adopt the Common External Tariff (CET) as proposed by
ECOWAS. Under the new ECOWAS tariff structure, Nigeria has adopted a
four-band arrangement, with duty rates of 0, 5, 10, and 20 percent for capital
goods, raw materials, intermediate products, and finished goods, respectively.
Consequently, the simple (unweighted) average tariff has declined from about
25 per cent to 17 per cent. A temporary 50 per cent band exists but to be phased
out by end-2007 while existing import bans are also to be eliminated
progressively. Trade liberalization reforms have simplified the tariff structure
in line with the government's objective of reducing uncertainty and
unpredictability in the country's trade policy regime (NPC, 2004)17. But here
again, the question arises as to what 'level' of trade liberalization is deemed
adequate to support successful capital account liberalization.
Domestic Financial Sector Reform
Although there is widespread evidence that an efficient financial sector is
important for long-run economic growth, implementing such reforms has been
difficult in Nigeria in the past. The financial system was repressed prior to the
structural adjustment program (SAP) that was introduced in 1986, as
evidenced by the negative real interest rates of that period (Table 1). Even
during the period of SAP, ceilings on interest rates were occasionally
17

See Chapter 7 of NPC (2004), the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
(NEEDS).
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reintroduced . In this regard, market-based reforms were proposed to ensure
that the 'true' cost of capital would be achieved and, thus, ensure a more
efficient allocation of resources. However, initial attempts at financial
liberalization in Nigeria yielded poor results. A poorly supervised and
inefficient financial sector, weak institutions and poor governance created
19
opportunities for arbitrage, patronage, and rent-seeking behavior . The reform
of the foreign exchange market during the SAP (discussed below) illustrates
this point.
Prior to the reforms of the late 1980s, foreign exchange sales in Nigeria were
highly controlled, and rationed by use of import licenses. In 1986, the foreign
exchange market was liberalized, with the Central Bank adopting a two-tiered
structure for the provision of foreign exchange. A first window operated at a
fixed exchange rate, to provide foreign currency for government transaction
such as debt servicing and financing foreign missions. A second, auction-based
window was established (i.e. the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market,
SFEM), which provided access to foreign exchange to licensed dealers. The
previous fixed exchange rate regime (which was determined by the
authorities) was also relaxed in favor of a floating exchange rate regime.
Bureaux-de-change were also permitted to operate beginning in 1989, and an
informal parallel market also existed for foreign exchange trading. Between
1986 and 1993, the authorities tried out various foreign exchange auction
mechanisms.
Large premiums existed in the foreign exchange market, and the multi-tiered
market provided opportunities for arbitrage and rentier practices (Table 2).
With the relaxation of rules for bank establishment in 1987, the number of
financial institutions in the country grew rapidly, with the number of banks
18

Interest rate controls were initially removed in 1987, and spurred the gradual increase of nominal
lending rates by financial institutions (see Table 1 below ). Controls were briefly reintroduced in 1991
when a poorly managed reform program had led to the development of several distressed banks, and the
diversion of capital to other unproductive activities. Interest rate controls were however abandoned in
1992, but with a stipulation for a 5 percent spread between cost of funds and lending rates (see Ikhide et al,
2002).
19
A broader survey of Nigeria's financial liberalization under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) is
provided by Lewis et al, 1997; Okogu, 1992; 1999; and Ikhide et al, 2002.
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increasing from 41 in 1986 to 120 in 1993 (Lewis, et al, 1997). There is
evidence that many new small banks as well as the elite with access to political
offices could obtain foreign currency at low (official) prices, and reap
20
substantial returns by re-selling in the bureaux de change or parallel market .
This inefficiency in the foreign exchange market was compounded by weak
regulation of financial institutions, and by the early 1990s, there was
widespread concern about the rising systemic risk in the Nigerian banking
sector (Lewis, et al, 1997; Ikhide, et al, 2002). A complete liberalization of
Nigeria's capital account in the presence of such internal distortions was likely
to exacerbate risks in the existing financial system.

20

To obtain the extent of this distortion, it is worth noting that the World Bank estimated that the indirect
subsidy arising from the spread between official and market rates amounted to $500 million in 1990 alone
(Okogu, 1999).
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Table 1: Nigeria: Lending and Deposit Rates (1975-2005)
Year

Nominal
Deposit
Rate

Nominal
Lending
Rate

Inflation
Rate

Real
Deposit
Rate

Real
Lending
Rate

1975

3.00

6.25

42.85

-39.85

-36.60

1976

2.67

6.50

20.00

-17.33

-13.50

1977

2.83

6.00

16.66

-13.83

-10.66

1978

4.15

6.75

21.42

-17.27

-14.67

1979

4.47

7.79

5.88

-1.41

1.91

1980

5.27

8.43

11.11

-5.84

-2.68

1981

5.72

8.92

25.00

-19.28

-16.08

1982

7.60

9.54

4.00

3.60

5.54

1983

7.41

9.98

26.92

-19.51

-16.94

1984

8.25

10.24

36.36

-28.11

-26.12

1985

9.12

9.43

8.88

0.24

0.55

1986

9.24

9.96

6.12

3.12

3.84

1987

13.09

13.96

9.61

3.48

4.35

1988

12.95

16.62

56.14

-43.19

-39.52

1989

14.68

20.44

50.56

-35.88

-30.12

1990

19.78

25.30

6.71

13.07

18.59

1991

14.92

20.04

13.28

1.64

6.76

1992

18.04

24.76

44.44

-26.40

-19.68

1993

23.42

31.65

57.69

-34.27

-26.04

1994

13.09

20.48

56.91

-43.82

-36.43

1995

13.53

20.23

72.71

-59.18

-52.48

1996

13.06

19.84

29.30

-16.24

-9.46

1997

7.17

17.80

8.19

-1.02

9.61

1998

10.11

18.18

10.29

-0.18

7.89

1999

12.81

20.29

6.67

6.14

13.62

2000

10.6

17.98

6.9

3.7

11.08

2001

10.2

18.29

18.9

-8.7

-0.61

2002

16.25

24.4

12.9

3.35

11.6

2003

13.86

20.48

14.0

-0.14

6.48

2004

12.9

19.15

15.0

-2.1

4.15

2005

10.23

17.85

17.9

-7.67

-0.05

Source: Ikhide et al (2002) for 1975-99 data; IMF/Central Bank of Nigeria for 2000-2005
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Table 2: Nigeria's Foreign Exchange Market (N/$), (1986-1994)
Year
1989
1989
1989
1989
1990
1990
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1994

Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4

Nominal
Rate

Parallel
Rate

Spread
(%)

7.40
7.48
7.25
7.51
7.90
7.94
7.96
8.34
9.43
9.47
10.95
9.87
12.49
18.57
18.85
19.59
22.28
22.22
21.89
21.89
21.89
21.89
21.89
21.89

10.51
10.58
10.30
10.66
9.48
9.53
9.55
10.02
12.99
13.05
15.09
13.60
18.23
19.44
20.81
22.84
28.19
34.86
37.65
43.91
49.73
50.43
66.91
81.02

42.03
41.44
42.07
41.94
20.00
20.03
19.97
20.14
37.75
37.80
37.81
37.79
45.96
4.68
10.40
16.59
26.53
56.89
72.00
100.59
127.18
130.38
205.66
270.12

Source: Okogu (1999)

More recently, financial sector reform has also been a major component of
Government's economic reforms. In the past, the Nigerian financial sector had
been weak in supporting economic development due to its fragmented nature
and the weak capital base of banks. To reform the sector, the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) launched a bank consolidation program in mid-2004 in which
all deposit money banks were required to raise their minimum capital base
from about N5 billion to N25 billion by the end of 2005. Banks failing to meet
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these new requirements were expected to merge, or else have their licenses
revoked. During the consolidation process, the number of banks in Nigeria was
reduced from 89 to 25, largely as a result of mergers and acquisitions. In the
process of meeting the new capital requirements, banks raised the equivalent
of about $3 billion from capital markets, and attracted about $652 million of
FDI into the Nigerian banking sector. A similar reform is also being carried out
for the insurance sector.
Foreign exchange markets have also been liberalized, with the government
adopting a wholesale auction format which merged the previous retail Dutch
Auction System and the interbank market for foreign exchange. The official
exchange rate has remained stable, while the previous parallel market
premium was eliminated by mid-2006. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, the spread
between the two rates has narrowed in line with the progress of the economic
reforms.
The recent bank consolidation reforms in the financial sector, liberalization of
interest rates, and convergence of exchange rates must be viewed as the
beginnings of an improved financial sector. These reforms would need to be
consolidated in the coming years to ensure the development of a strong
financial sector. Closely linked to the subject of financial repression has been
the history of inadequate prudential supervision in the Nigerian banking sector
which is the focus of the next section.
Prudential Regulation of the Financial Sector
Following financial liberalization in 1986, there was a rapid growth in
financial institutions, with the number of banks tripling to about 120 by 1992.
Various other financial institutions such as mortgage, insurance and brokerage
houses also expanded, spurred by opportunities in retail trade, foreign
exchange trading, and urban real estate (Lewis, et al, 1997).
Regulatory oversight however did not keep pace with the rapid growth of
financial institutions in the late 1980s and 1990s. The Nigerian Deposit
Insurance Corporation (NDIC) was established in 1989, while the CBN
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Decree (No 24 of 1991) and the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree
(BOFID, No 25 of 1991) were enacted21. Yet weak supervision of the sector
remained. There is evidence that many banks had poor balance sheets and
made limited lending to the private sector, and engaged predominantly in other
short-term arbitrage activities. By 1993, it was estimated that about half of the
licensed banks were distressed.
Since 2003, various prudential practices have also been adopted by the
Nigerian authorities to support the development of sound domestic financial
institutions, to promote effective risk management, and to protect investors.
Weak regulatory oversight had fostered the growth of several weak and
distressed banks in the 1980s and 1990s.

21

Replacing the CBN Act of 1958 (as amended) and the Banking Decree of 1969 (as amended)
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Table 3: Nigeria's Foreign Exchange Market (1999-2006)
Official rate

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria

Parallel
market rate

Spread (%)
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Against this backdrop, recent improvements in supervision by the CBN are
noteworthy. The Central Bank's supervisory powers are being strengthened,
with a migration from a prudential supervision system to a risk-based approach
within the framework of the Basel-II Accord. Capacity-building programs to
support the development of central bank officials in various risk assessment
tools have been organized as well as the upgrading of supervision software
used by the authorities. A new Draft Corporate Governance Code of Conduct is
being developed to oversee activities of stakeholders in the financial sector.
Finally, as a precautionary measure, Government is also developing
contingency plans to ensure the smooth handling of merger breakdowns if they
occur in the future.
The Central Bank implemented various measures to ensure a smooth
liquidation of banks which failed to meet the new capitalization requirements.
Appropriate legislation-under the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation
(NDIC) Act-also provides a comprehensive framework for addressing the case
of private depositors who may be affected by the liquidation process.
At present, the CBN has presented drafts of the CBN Act as well as the BOFI
Act Amendment Bill to the National Assembly. Successful passage of these
Bills would grant the Central Bank greater autonomy in performing its
oversight functions of domestic financial institutions.
VI.

Time for Capital Account Liberalization in Nigeria?

In the light of the above discussion, the question that policymakers will have to
deal with is not whether, but how to introduce capital account liberalization. It
is a logical and inescapable step for a reforming economy with ambition to
optimize its engagement with the international financial markets. Recent
developments indicate that Nigeria has made significant progress towards
meeting the prerequisites for liberalizing the capital account. These include
progress in fiscal consolidation, reforms in the domestic financial system,
including strengthening regulatory institutions, and providing an appropriate
framework for the effective utilization of international capital flows. The
sequencing signposts-macroeconomic stabilization, current account
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liberalization, financial sector reform and prudential supervision of the
banking sector-are acknowledged to have improved in Nigeria since the
reforms.
However, it begs two questions: firstly, has the “improvement” gone far
enough to satisfy the requirements for liberalization and how much more
“improvement” is needed to reach the desired level of comfort? Secondly,
given the evidence of poor management of the past two decades, can it be taken
for granted that the reforms have sufficiently taken root to warrant full capital
account liberalization? The questions are related, and the answer would appear
to be that a longer period of sustained economic management and reforms,
including of institutions, may be needed before comprehensive opening of the
financial account. In this context, the adoption of appropriate legislation, such
as the Fiscal Responsibility Bill, the amended Central Bank Act, and the BOFI
Act, would help by ensuring the institutionalization of prudent fiscal,
monetary and banking sector policies.
In relation to the economic policy and management of the past twenty years,
the recent economic reforms signal an initial recovery and convalescence
period for the Nigerian economy. In this vein, an additional period of sustained
economic reforms and growth is still needed, which would signal long-term
recovery of the economy, and the maturity of the institutions needed to support
the challenges of managing unfettered international capital flows. By
maintaining the current course of economic reforms, and introducing
appropriate legislation to support the reforms, Nigeria would improve
institutional and regulatory capacity of its financial sector, thereby enabling
the country to further integrate its financial sector into global markets. As
argued by Kose, et al (2006), the major benefits of capital account
liberalization to developing countries may be obtained not from its direct
contribution to increased GDP growth or reduced consumption volatility, but
instead by providing a set of 'collateral benefits'. In the case of Nigeria, given a
history of weak economic management, the actual process leading to further
opening of the capital account could engender greater institutional
development, improved financial supervision, and greater macroeconomic
discipline.
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Another factor worthy of consideration is that a resource-dependent, emerging
economy like Nigeria may require extra caution in moving towards capital
account liberalization precisely because it has one less degree of freedom: oil
revenue is exogenous to the economy. The present favorable fiscal and
monetary aggregates (good fiscal balance, excess crude oil revenue savings,
large and rising level of international reserves, etc.) though attributable
primarily to prudent management, have occurred against the backdrop of a
favorable external environment. The strong performance of the international
oil market has shifted the terms of trade strongly in favor of the Nigerian
economy. Policymaking in respect of any factors that could have a bearing on
any of the four sequencing signposts must be considered realistically. In this
context, the present high oil price regime cannot be taken for granted for the
purpose of planning. If, for example, the price were to revert back to its longrun average of about $27 per barrel, the present strong fiscal position could be
threatened and the CBN will have to let the naira depreciate or risk losing
international reserves. Under such a scenario, if the capital account is already
liberalized, there could be speculative attacks on the naira, and there could also
be reverse capital flows, particularly as “hot money” moves out. Hence, an
analysis of the sequencing of capital account liberalization in a resourcedependent economy requires careful consideration, probably with more
stringent requirements. Such economies need to achieve a higher degree of
fiscal, monetary, structural and institutional consolidation than other
economies before opening up the capital account.
VII. Conclusion
Nigeria's recent economic reforms have set the country on a path of recovery,
including meeting the basic prerequisites for capital account liberalization.
However, these need to be deepened and sustained for a while, including
underpinning the reforms through legislation, before moving to full
liberalization. This is even more important in the case of an oil-dependent
economy such as Nigeria's which may be susceptible to large external termsof-trade shocks. Overall, the process of preparing for capital account
liberalization in Nigeria could provide 'collateral benefits', and spur the
strengthening of the domestic institutions, greater macroeconomic discipline,
and improved financial supervision.
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Going forward, further research is needed to support policymaking as Nigeria
considers its options for capital account liberalization in the future. While a
number of authors have reviewed liberalization of the Nigerian financial sector
in the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, Lewis, et al, 1997; Ikhide, et al,
2002), few have systematically evaluated the options for capital account
liberalization. Three areas of research could help improve our understanding in
this regard. First, given the available data for Nigeria in the past three decades,
it may be valuable to quantify the extent of capital account restrictiveness in
each year (for example, based on Nigeria's AREAER descriptions), and
examine its impact on portfolio and FDI inflows into the country. In the light of
the importance of institutions, a second, and more forward-looking research
exercise, may be to develop an institutional quality index for Nigeria's
financial sector, which tracks its performance over time. Based on qualitative
information, this index could be constructed for financial sector institutions in
Nigeria (as well as other countries) for the past two decades, and updated
annually. Such an exercise could enable policymakers to effectively
benchmark Nigeria's institutional performance against other emerging market
economies. Finally, some research on the specific depth of reform needed for a
resource-dependent economy like Nigeria's could shed some light on the
timing of capital account liberalization.
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